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Tax-ExemptInterest as a Cost to Borrowing
Governments and as a Yield to Investors
SUMMARY
The full story of postwar interest rate developments has yet to
be written. This chapter cannot cover the entire subject;it can
only concentrate on interest rate developments that were unique
to the field of state and local government borrowing.
The most important fact to be considered is that yields on tax-
exempt securities increased much more than almost any other
comparable interest rate since World War II. During the almost
unbroken boom of the postwar decade interest rates increased con-
siderably. The largest relative increase for any major long-term
yield, however, was that experienced in state and local government
borrowing. The basic long-term yield on high-grade issues of this
type increased from one per cent in the spring of 1946 to almost
per cent in the late summer of 1957. Short-term tax-exempt
yields went up relatively even more, as was true of all short-term
interest rates. Because the underwriting margins also increased,
the cost of borrowing by state and local governments increased even
more than yields. Such an increase in interest costs meant that the
total amortization cost of a 20-year serial debt with equal maturi-
ties increased by almost a fourth; for a 30-year debt the total
amortization cost increased by more than a third.
One commonly offered explanation of the exceptionally large
increase in tax-exempt yields is that restrictive monetary policies
influenced them in an unusual degree. Monetary policy doubtless
had a powerful and pervasive effect on interest rates generally.
The case for a differential impact, however, is far less clear.
The narrowing differential between tax-exempt and fully taxable
interest rates cannot be explained by tax expectations; quite the
contrary, the expectations as to tax rate changes should have pro-
duced quite different differentials from •the ones that, in fact,
prevailed.
The most convincing explanation, and the one most in accord
with both logic and fact, is that in order to market the increased
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volume of state and local government securities, new investors had
to be brought into the market and that these new investors had a
lower marginal use for tax exemption. This point has already been
developed in Chapter 3. In other words, to find markets for the
considerably increased volume of offerings, the privilege of tax
exemption had to be bargained away for less and less to investors
for whom tax exemption had a relatively low marginal value.
Another significant observation with respect to tax-exempt in-
terest yields during the postwar decade was that they fluctuated
through a somewhat wider range than had been true of other long-
term interest rates. One possible line of explanation explored in
this chapter is the somewhat more volatile character of new issue
yields compared with those which prevail in the secondary market.
Since most of the customary measures of open-market interest rates
depend on secondary market sources, there is a danger that these
commonly cited figures conceal the true course of events. Though
there is some merit in the point, our investigations suggested that
new issue versus secondary market experience would not account
for the wider fluctuations in state and local government yields ex-
cept to a relatively small extent. The more convincing reason ap-
pears to be that commercial banks have been an extraordinarily
important part of this market. For reasons of general banking
policy, commercial banks have been quite volatile investors. In-
directly, of course, this may reflect the influence of monetary policy.
The third major characteristic of the postwar market for state
and local government securities has been that the interest rate
differential between lower credit quality and higher credit quality
borrowers persisted more than the comparable differential in the
corporate field. This is an extraordinarily puzzling fact. Various
hypotheses that might explain it were tested, but none of them
yielded satisfactory results; the question is worthy of further in-
vestigation. The principal significance of this finding, however, is
that the financial problems of state and local government in the
future may be even more acute than some forecasters have suggested
since an increased volume of borrowing inevitably means some re-
duction in the quality of the securities issued. On this basis it may
be expected that there will be increasing problems in financing
state and local government capital improvements.
The fourth major characteristic of postwar state and local govern-
'59TAX-EXEMPT INTEREST AS COST AND YIELD
ment yields is that the yield curves or the relationship
between yield and maturity for these securities were not parallel to
those found in other sectors of the capital markets. The differences
were sometimes so sharp that they cast doubt on the popular
hypotheses that the maturity-yield relationship of interest rates re-
flects risk of loss on long-term obligations. Experience has shown
that the serial offering scales of tax-exempt obligations often depart
from the other yield curves appreciably. How much of this is due
to the inflexible supply of unpopular maturities cannot be esti-
mated. Experience with term bonds such as of toll roads is still
too brief to forecast the pattern they will develop. It presumably
will be similar to that of term corporate securities. The only
hypothesis that seems to explain this interesting fact is that the
market for state and local government securities is a highly seg-
mented market. Demand in one segment of the market can vary
considerably from the demand that prevails in other portions of
the money markets or the capital markets.
The net effect of all four of these factors, but particularly of the
first and third, has been to create a vast shift in the way in which
the benefits of tax exemption are divided between borrowing govern-
ments and investors. The economic (if not the political) equivalent
of tax exemption is that of a subsidy. Near the beginning of the
postwar period it would appear that a very large part of the tax
revenue foregone by the federal government was recaptured by
state and local governments in lower borrowing costs. In fact the
quantity of borrowing was small and so what in actuality took
place was that investors in tax exempts from earlier periods 'were
given the chance to realize capital gains. State and local govern-
ments did not get much advantage from this brief episode. But as
the decade went along, this condition changed and investors were
able to demand a larger and larger portion of the benefits of tax
exemption and state and local governments were able to retain less
of, them. The subsidy lost much of its effectiveness. In the final
part of this chapter, some admittedly rough estimates of the way
in which this differential has been divided 'between borrowers and
investors are presented.
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RELATIVELY GREAT INCREASE IN TAX-EXEMPT YIELDS
DURING POSTWAR DECADE
The much greater increase in yields on tax-exempt state and local
government securities is evident in any comparison of interest rate
changes. In the spring of 1946, a top-rated state and local govern-
mental unit could have sold its twenty-year obligations at an in-
terest cost of less than 1 per cent. In the late summer of 1957 a
similar borrower would have had to pay almost percent for
twenty-year money. The unusual degree of this increase in interest
costs is disclosed by a comparison with other yield changes. During
the same interval, the yield on fully taxable U.S. government twenty-
year obligations went from about 21/4percent to almost 33/4per
cent, an increase of 11/2 percentage points. The interest cost for
newly marketed high-grade corporate bonds rose from about
percent to more than per cent, an increase of two percentage
points. Increases in yields on high-grade corporate bonds in the
secondary market were less, about the same as for U.S. Treasury
long-term bonds. If yields on state and local government securities
had increased only in the same proportion as those on U.S. Treasury
or high-grade corporate bonds they would have risen only to about
2 per cent. In other words the major part of the tax-exempt yield
increase must be explained by factors applying uniquely to that
market.
The contrast between tax-exempt state and local government
security yields and those on corporate bonds was (and is) greatest
for the highest grade obligations. The differences were considerably
less for intermediate-grade securities. This is shown in Chart 8. In
this chart, the Aaa tax-exempt yield is shown as a ratio of the Aaa
corporate yield; the Baa tax-exempt yield is also shown as a ratio
of the Baa corporate yield. For comparative purposes, the corporate
tax rate (for large corporations) is also shown. This chart demon-
strates that the erosion of the borrowing advantage of tax exemption
during the postwar decade has not been a steady matter; the differ-
ential has moved erratically.
Using 1946 as the starting point for. our tax-exempt yield com-
parison undoubtedly results in some bias. The volume of new
issues was very small and market supplies in the secondary markets
were also limited. The 1946 yields were priced in a very thin market.TAX-EXEMPT INTEREST AS COST AND YIELD
The extremely low yields on state and local government obligations
in that year were partly due to a fear that there might be a shortage
of tax-exempt investment outlets now that tax exemption was not
available on newly offered federal obligations. In retrospect the
fear seems odd, but editorial comment at that time confirms its
CHART 8
Municipal Bond Yields as a Percentage of
Comparable Corporate Bond Yields
reality. With full allowance for the market effects of this fear, one
cannot help wondering why tax exemption should have been given
such a high value at that particular juncture. Applicable income
tax rates had just been lowered and in that short idyllic interlude
before the threat of war once more revived, the expectation must
have been for even further tax reductions.
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diaries appears to have gained relative to direct individual invest-
ment.1 Many of the principal institutional investors are themselves
either exempt from federal income taxation, pay only low marginal
rates of taxes, or are unable to pass along the value of tax exemp-
tion to their equity investors as was elaborated in Chapter 3. Life
insurance companies are now subject to a 61/2 per cent gross invest-
ment income tax rate. Public and private pension funds, both among
the most rapidly growing investment institutions, can, and usually
do, qualify for complete tax exemption. Mutual investment com-
panies can qualify for tax exemption but cannot pass the benefits
of tax exemption on their investments along to their stockholders.
Among institutional investors, the only two important groups sub-
ject to the full corporate tax rate are commercial banks; and fire,
marine, and casualty insurance companies. Both of these types of
institutions have frequently been important investors in tax-exempt
securities; on some occasions they have put a large fraction of their
accruing money in this market. But tax-exempt securities are hardly
the most desirable form of investment for either type of institution.
Customer loans continue to be the favorite outlet of commercial
banks. With the special 85 per cent dividend credit on corporate
equities, fire, marine, and casualty insurance companies pay taxes
of only 7.8 per cent on dividend income (52 per cent times 15 per
cent). This makes equity investment very attractive—except when
equity prices get very high.
Individual investors with high incomes can choose tax-exempt
obligations with considerable logic. But this is a defensive form o.f
investment; it preserves only the dollar integrity of principal and
shelters income from taxation. The widespread forecast of secular
inflation has led many investment counselors to emphasize more
the preservation of real value than of dollar amounts. Capital gains
have been more emphasized as an investment objective; they have
some tax and many strategic advantages. Other shelters from taxa-
tion can be found in such investment media as oil royalties and
rental real estate.
The timing of the shrinkage in yield differentials suggests that
monetary policy is only a partial explanation at most. Much of the
1RaymondGoldsmith, Financial intermediaries inthe American Economy
(Princeton University Press for National Bureau, 1958), Chapters vii and ix,
particularly Table 91, p. 304.
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shrinkage had occurred before 1951, when monetary policy was
reactivated. Furthermore,, it. is hard to find any persuasive reason
why monetary tension, should have had an unusually severe effect
on the tax-exempt market, except commerical banks are' un-
usually important investors in this market. Commercial banks are
probably more directly affected by monetary policy than other
financial institutions. It is true, of course, that state and local gov-
ernments rely less on current surplus for capital expenditures and
are less facile in the temporary use of short-term credits, both
features of which help business corporations minimize the impact
of monetary policy.
One would expect the differential between tax-exempt and fully
taxable yields to respond not only to accomplished changes in tax,
rates but also to expectations as to future tax rates. This is par-
ticularly true of long-term tax-exempt obligations which discount
tax rate expectations rather far into the future. Unfortunately the
facts do not give much support to the hypothesis that this was a
significant market factor. In the beginning of the postwar period,
tax cut expectations were high but have since been dimmed by the
course of international political developments. On the basis of
these expectations the differential should have started narrow and
become wider—the opposite of actual events.
Tax rate expectations clearly have been a market factor from
time to time. In the fall of 1950 the prices of tax-exempt securities
were bid up when other prices were going down. This was true
likewise in earlier periods. After World War I the level of income
tax rates was reduced sharply; the value of tax .exemptionwas
correspondingly discounted. During the New Deal period in the
1930's most investors, bitterly opposed as they were to the prevailing
political temper of the times, found it hard to believe that steeply
progressive rates of taxation were an enduring element in the
political system. Much the same could have been. said during the
early phases of World War II. But the size of. the federal debt and
many other factors changed the views of many investors.. .By the.
time the postwar period was underway, most.investorshad come,
no matter how reluctantly, to believe that relatively high tax rates
were likely in the foreseeable future. When high-grade tax-exempt
yields for twenty years dipped under one per cent in' 1946, buyers
of tax exempts were, in effect, discounting. this privilege over the
164TAX-EXEMPT INTEREST AS 'COST AND YIELD
next. twenty years at a marginal rate in excess of 60 per cent. This
is shown with Aaa and Baa municipal yields as a relative of similar
corporate yields in Chart 8. Since this was considerably in excess
of the 38 per cent rate on corporations at the time, the valuation
of the market is hard to understand.2 When Congress was con-
sidering a revision of tax rates in 1948, the prices of tax exempts
were weak for a while but this was reversed in the mild recession
of 1949.
The other side of the story is that the yield discount(price
premium) of Aaa municipal bonds in 1953 came to be as low as 22
per cent. The value of tax exemption was only about two-fifths
of the corporate tax rate and was equal to the marginal tax on in-
come of individuals with only about $10,000 of income per annum.
In neither case can it be said that expectations of tax rate changes
justified such a change. In fact if a boom period reduces the ex-
pectation of tax reductions and enhances the prospects of indi-
viduals' advancing to higher tax brackets, as would seem reasonable,
this factor should moderate the price reduction for tax-exempt
securities. But, as shown above, the actual course of price develop.
ments has been quite the contrary.
Tax rates clearly have some relationship to yield differentials, as
would be expected. One investment counsel service determines a
"normal" relationship between Treasury yields and tax-exempt
yields by a multiple regression using Treasury bond yields, existing
tax rates for higher income individuals and for corporations as
independent variables. Correlation coefficients of about .9 prevail
between the presumptive normal yields and the actually observed
Even though this indicates a considerable relationship of yield
differentials to tax rates, this analyst also observed that expectations
appeared to lead actual tax rate changes by an appreciable margin.
Time-lagged correlations were not computed, but this relationship
seemed evident in the charts of this counseling service. This correla-
tion was• computed only for Aaa or Aa securities. These securities
have preserved the greatest amount of differential, as indicated in
2 Particularly so in light of the fact that individuals appear to have been
selling tax exempts or at least failing to maintain their investment position in
them while, commercial banks were the only buyers during first half of 1946.
8 J. Eugene Banks of Brown Brothers Harriman and Company, institutional
investment counseling service.
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another section of this chapter. Among securities of lower credit
quality such high correlations might not be found.
Failure of the market for the privilege of tax exemption to
pand probably explains most but not all of the differential yield
movements. In the first place, the significance of the under-l-per
cent yield on twenty-year state and local government obligations
at the beginning of the decade may be questioned. The volume
of new issues was negligible; almost the only bonds available were
those in the secondary market. The Blue List of that period showed
offerings only slightly in excess of 100 million. The proportion of
issues of top quality was not unusually high. In other words, the
yields quoted at that period must have been based on a relatively
thin market.
Another factor that might account for a high-grade yield change
would be a change in the proportion of state and local govern-
mental units with high credit standing that are borrowing. At the
beginning of the decade, the governmental units with high credit
standing were borrowing very little; most of those coming to the
market had an intermediate credit It could have been
said that the supply of high-grade issues was short relative to the
supply of issues of other qualities. But the widespread need for
large state and local governmental capital expenditures brought
more conservatively financed and richer communities into the
market. Public Housing Authority issues, which are of the highest
quality, became an increasingly important factor in the market.
There was no shortage of high-grade issues at the end of 1956!
While the supply of high-grade issues increased relatively, this
factor cannot explain the over-all yield increases. Yields of inter-
mediate-grade state and local government securities increased by
just about as much as those of high-grade issues. The general quality
of state and local government credit probably has not changed
materially. Large borrowing may have reduced it a bit but at most
from something like a "superb" to a "very good" rating.
The large increase in state and local governmental yields com-
pared with the relatively and absolutely much smaller one which
has been shown by U.S. Treasury obligations must be considered
against the background fact that the marketable debt of the federal
government increased relatively little over the decade, while that
4See Table 7.
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of state and bat government had risen to more than three times
its earlier level. The U.S. Treasury had to raise some new money,
but its major problem was that of refunding the outstanding debt.
While the total debt grew moderately in the postwar period, the
marketable portion of the net debt changed very little.
But this relatively greater increase in debt is not the whole story.
While the new money demands of state and local government were
large, so were those of corporations. If the demand for new money
explained the differential advance in state and local governmental
yields, then the increase in corporate yields should have more nearly
paralleled that of state and local governments than that of treasury
obligations. This was not true: corporate yields, if measured by the
cost of new money, went up only a bit more than yields on U.S.
Treasury obligations: a matter ofof a percentage point at most.
Corporate yield experience was much closer to that of Treasury
financing than to that of state and local government borrowings.
Tax exemption clearly isolated the market for state and local gov-
ernment securities from other capital markets.
WIDE PRICE FLUCTUATION OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
The yields of long-term state and local government securities
fluctuate through a wider range than any other important long-term
interest rate. Any chart showing the history of bond yields demon-
strates the fact The large-scale buying of tax exempts
in late 1950 produced a drastic price effect. The prices of tax
exempts dropped more when the U.S. government security market
was unpegged in early 1951 than did the prices of Treasury bonds
themselves. The further drop in prices to mid-1953 was also greater
for tax exempts than it was for taxable bonds. The recovery of
prices after mid-1953 to mid-1954 was also greater for tax exempts
than for taxable obligations. Again in late 1956, tax-exempt prices
went down more than other bond prices.
The wider amplitude of price fluctuations is also shown in Chart
9. This chart is based on a series of prices derived from yields. To
furnish comparability, the prices were derived for state and local
government and corporate securities having a rating of Aa. Both
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series were taken from Moody's Investors Service, as were the ratings.
In both cases, the prices were those representing a constant twenty.
year maturity bond. To facilitate comparison, the corporate bond
was given a 3 per cent coupon which brought its average near par;
a 2 per cent coupon for the municipal did likewise. In other words,
the prices do not represent a single bond (which would shorten
in maturity as time .passed) but an assumed average of a portfolio
with a constant maturity of twenty years. This was felt to ap-
proximate more closely the price experience of investors than any
other form of representation. The much wider range of price
fluctuation for state and local government securities is easily evident
to the eye. The average variation of price for the municipal series
was more than twice that of the corporate series for the entire 1937-
1955 period. In the period since March 1951 (the Federal Reserve-
Treasury "accord") both fluctuated a bit more than before and the
difference in range is not quite as large, with the municipal average
range a little less than twice that of corporate bonds.
The wider range of yield fluctuation for state and local govern-
ment obligations than for corporate or U.S. Treasury bond yields
appears to be due to a combination of circumstances. In addition
to the general economic influences that apply to all capital markets
equally, the valuation of state and local government securities in-
volves pricing the privilege of tax exemption. This makes it a
narrower market.
A further circumstance influencing state and local government
security yields is that this market is more subject to inventory
adjustments. The supply of corporate obligations in the secondary
market is seldom very large; the supply of new and unsold corporate
issues is more often zero than any other amount. The supply of
Treasury obligations in the market is concentrated in the shorter
maturities; supplies of the longer maturities are seldom truly large.
Sometimes one or two dealers will be holding a speculative position
in long bonds, but inventory is more sporadic than regular. When
market signs are adverse, these inventories are cleared out quickly.
But the market for state and local government securities appar-
ently cannot operate satisfactorily without an inventory of signifi-
cant size; sometimes it seems to need quite a large amount. Even
though dealers may see the signs of marked adversity, they find
it hard to reduce inventories quickly. Since many state and local
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government finance authorities in offering their securities for com-
petitive bidding do not respond quickly to adverse market develop-
ments, inventory may pile up from new-issue marketing much more
than is true of the corporate field, where the units are larger,
financing plans can be changed more quickly, and the proportion
of negotiated deals is larger. The influence of unsold inventory
on this market is material. Several periods of this influence stand out
quite evidently. In the fall of 1947 when the Federal Reserve started
supporting Treasury bond prices, and on Christmas Eve when this
support was dropped to par, both the corporate and the tax-exempt
market responded by weakening. But whereas the initial response
of the corporate market accounted for most of its change, the tax-
exempt market continued to be weak well into 1948 until inventory
had been worked back to more normal proportions. Much the
same was true in 1951 when the Federal Reserve dropped par
support altogether. In the spring of 1953 when the entire capital
market was relativelytight, tax-exempt securities followed the
general pattern of weakness. Although the recovery of Treasury
and corporate bond prices started in early June after Federal Re-
serve easing was evident, it did not show up as promptly in the
tax-exempt market; some inventory had to be worked off before
the influence of credit ease was fully evident.
The unusual coupon practices that prevail in this field(see
Appendix B) and the wider range of outstanding coupons may
account for some, though probably only a small part, of the greater
price volatility of state and local government securities. When
Durand and Winn were studying bond yields in the early postwar
period, they encountered the fact that, other things being equal,
high-coupon tax-exempt obligations sold at a higher yield than
those with coupons near the levels of market yields.6 Investors
apparently did not like to pay the large premiums involved in
high-coupon obligations; trust administrators had to amortize them
to preserve equity between life tenants and remaindermen but
amortization sometimes involves legal problems. In smaller port-
folios reinvestment of principal is awkw4rd. Since the Durand-Winn
survey was made,. yields have gone up a great deal. Some high-
coupon long-term bonds are still outstanding, but the effect of
coupon on yield is far less clear than it was earlier. Durand and
6TechnicalPaper 6 (National Bureau, 1947), pp. 31-40.
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Winn solved the problem of quality uniformity by use of New York
City bonds and corporate stock.7 The subsequent retirement of a
large number of the high-coupon issues meant that similar com-
parisons must be based on fewer observations. But a number of
other coupon effects were noted and confirmed by traders. In periods
of relatively easy money in 1949 and 1954, high-coupon short-term
issues sold at lower yields than comparable maturities with lower
coupons. Banks sometimes prefer high-coupon issues for reasons
outlined in Chapter 3.and paid a slight premium for them. But in
1955, when bank credit was tight, high-coupon short-term issues
sold at higher yields than comparable issues with lower coupons.
High-coupon long-term issues generally sell at slightly higher yields
iftheir coupon throws their price thaterially above par. This
premium is large in a low-rate period such as when Durand and
Winn were making their observations but it has been far smaller
recently.
Another coupon-induced effect has emerged in recent periods:
when yields have gone up so that low-coupon issues sell below par,
their yield is also slightly above comparable high-coupon maturities
of comparable quality. This effect is confined to municipals, rather
the reverse being true of corporate obligations. The reason for this
phenomenon seems to be as follows: if the low-coupon issue was
originally sold at par, the holder can claim tax exemption only
for the amount of the coupon; the approach of such an under-par
security to par by the working of amortization mathematics is
treated as a taxable capital gain. So the full yield of such a low
coupon obligation is not tax exempt, only the coupon. For example,
in January 1957, $1 million of 13/4 per cent general revenue bonds
of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority maturing in 1960
were offered in the secondary market priced to yield 3.25 per cent.
On the same day City of San Antonio Electric and Gas Systems
Revenue Improvement bonds—an issue of comparable (or at least
no higher) quality—were offered with the 1960 maturity (coupon
4 per cent) priced to yield 2.80 per cent. Seattle school district bonds,
also of comparable but no higher quality, were offered on the same
day priced to yield 2.80 per cent on the 1960 maturity (coupon
6 per cent).8
7 They also paired bonds of one corporate issuer.
S The New York Times, January 21, 1957, financial advertisements.
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Only the 13/4percent coupon on the Triborough bonds was tax
exempt; the other 1½ per cent of the offered yield was subject to
capital gains taxation. Allowing for taxation of this at the prevailing
25 per cent level for long-term capital gains, the net tax-exempt
yield of the Triborough bonds was slightly more than 2.85 per cent,
quite in line with the offering yields of comparable new issues.
When it was originally sold at a discount, the holder of a low
coupon bond can claim the original yield as being tax exempt.
Thus ilow-coupon° terminal maturities may offer full tax exemption.
But even in these cases, low coupons are not popular in the market
and require from 35 to 70 basis points higher yields.
From these observations, the following statement might be gen-
eralized: the effects of a high coupon on a short-maturity issue
depend on the state of the money markets. Both a high coupon on
a long-term issue and a low coupon on all issues (particularly if
sold at a low yield by the issuer) tend to sell at higher yields than
comparable maturities with coupons near to market yields. Investors,
with the exceptions noted above, prefer municipal securities that
sell near par.1°
The hypothesis that is the most persuasive one in accounting for
the considerable volatility of tax-exempt security prices is that com-
mercial banks have been such important but unstable investors in
them. As the evidence in Chapter 3 showed, commercial banks have
absorbed as much as two-thirds of the new issues offered on the
market in some semiannual periods; in others they absorbed none
of the net increase. No other class of investors has alternately en-
tered or retreated from the market with such great variability.
The reason commercial banks are such volatile investors in these
securities is that they do not give them a top priority among the
investment alternatives open tothem. Commercial banks are
dominantly customer-lending institutions. The next priority is for
liquidity, and even short-term tax-exempt securities are not par-
ticularly liquid. The purchase of tax-exempt sçcurities thus has a
relatively low priority in the application of funds. For this reason
9 See Chapter 3 and Appendix B for an account of why such coupons are
offered.
10 Investors buying callable corporate securities in the secondary market prefer
low-coupon securities selling under par since these will not be "lost" to a call
as readily. Thus, in a price decline, this factor sustains the prices of low-coupon
corporate issues whereas low-coupon municipals sell off just that much more.
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commercial banks may have been far less dependable buyers of
taxexemptsthan the institutional investors that have accounted
for the principal purchases of corporate bonds, such as life insurance
companies and pension funds and other trust accounts. To the
extent that this hypothesis is valid it raises an interesting question
for the future: will the growth in money supply requirements,
which guides the release of reserves by the central bank, be at such
a pace as to expand or constrict the relative proportions of securi-
ties taken by commercial banks?
THE INFLUENCE OF CREDIT QUALITY ON YIELD
One of the most significant differentials among state and local
government security yields is that induced by differences in the
qualities of individual securities. The yield differentials between
grades of corporate securities shrank considerably during the post-
war decade. But the differentials between grades of state and local
government securities continued to be large. These differentials
are shown in Chart 10 in absolute amounts (of yield) and in rela-
tive amounts (yield differential as a ratio to highest grade yield)
in Chart 11.
Neither basis of comparison is wholly satisfactory. An investor
might consider the risk premium he would require to be a propor-
tion of the basic high-grade yield available to him. For example,
in a given circumstance an investor might assume a given risk
gladly if he could improve his yield from 2 per cent to 3 per cent.
He might, however, hesitate to assume the same risk in order to
improve his yield from 5 per cent to 6 per cent. But if the differ-
ential is looked at as a fund that might be accumulated in reserve
form, then an absolute amount is more nearly consistent with the
actuarial nature of risk than a relative amount. The market does
not seem to hold clearly to just one of these views; both are shown
for reference purposes.
The measure of quality we used has been that of the ratings
assigned by Moody's Investors Service. This source furnishes un-
usually comparable data because they not only prepare the ratings
of individual securities but also compile yields by the same quality
ratings. Such experience as has accumulated with rating systems
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this record has been tested only for corporate bonds,h1 we have no
reason for expecting the accuracy of municipal bond ratings to be
less than that of corporates. The fundamental quality differences
among the various rating groups probably are moderate. Practically
all municipal credits that are rated fall within the top four rating
groups. The rating agencies class securities in all four top groups
as being of "investment quality." In other words, they judge state
and local government credits to be generally good; some are better
than others, but most of them are rated good. No rating agency
gives even a Baa rating to a credit if it has dubious characteristics;
rather, it is a good credit but with less margin of protection than
the very top qualities. The Hickman survey of corporate bond
quality cited above found that the differences in investment experi-
ence among quality ratings, while positively correlated, were smaller
relatively than the yield differentials. In other words, the corporate
bond market exacted a considerable surcharge for the risk element
in corporate credit.
The quality yield differentials found in municipal bonds are so
large as to raise questions as to the rationality of investment be-
havior. For example, the margin between the Aaa yields and Baa
yields has averaged close to one percentage point during the post-
war decade. Without some quantitative measure of risk this figure
cannot mean much in itself. We can be confident, however, that
the worst investment experience of a reasonably diversified portfolio
of tax exempts in the Great Depression would have been far more
than covered by a 1 per cent risk premium. The highest default
estimate anyone made was 15 per cent (most were much smaller)
and no one believes that ultimate losses to investors were more
than I per cent of the debt outstanding. As shown below, a diversi-
fied portfolio of Baa state and local government securities should
be able to accumulate a risk reserve that would allow for a Great
Depression every few years and still show a handsome margin over
the Aaa yields. Even the margin between the two highest grades
Uw, BraddockHickman, Corporate Bond Quality and investor Experience
(Princeton University Press for National Bureau, 1958), Chapter 3, particularly
pp. 174-210. Hickman found the agency ratings were better for large than for
small issues and these ratings did not anticipate the unfavorable experience of
some industries such as railroads. But, with allowance for these qualifications,
agency rating of corporate bonds wasafairly good forecaster of relative default
experience.
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has run from 10 to 20 basis points.12 A margin of 10 basis points
would accumulate an appreciable reserve over a long period of
time.
The significance of yield differentials as risk premiums is prob-
ably best measured by calculating the reserve fund that could be
accumulated with such differentials. As a starting point we might
assume that periods of distress in municipal finance come rather
rarely; they are considerably more than twenty years apart. Aside
from such periods of widespread difficulty, the record of municipal
credit has been remarkably good. Thus if a twenty-year period be
used, and if the yields and yield differentials of the year 1955 be
used, the following results are shown:
a. The Baa yield margin over the Aaa yield would accumulate a
fund of about $260 over a 20-year period per $1,000 bond.
b. The A yield margin over the Aaa yield would accumulate a
fund of about $125 over a 20-year period per $1,000 bond.
c. The Aa yield margin over the Aaa yield would accumulate a
fund of about $35 over a 20-year period per $1,000 bond.
This overestimation of risk coverage is not as surprising as it first
seems. The PHA obligations furnish an interesting example. The
bonds of various local housing authorities covered by a contract
with the Public Housing Administration guaranteeing service of
these bonds amounts to a tax-exempt credit guaranteed by the fed-
eral government. But in the sales of these securities, differential
yields are put on the securities of differing authorities but of the
same Some "names" sell better than others. The invest-
ment bankers making the offerings concede the irrationality of such
differentials, but they know from experience that investors prefer
the securities of some localities and they allow for these preferences
in their bids. As many as three or four reoffering scales may be used
indicating three or four types of judgment made by the market.
Every so often a small high-quality issue, sold virtually simul-
taneously with a batch of new PHA contract housing authority
bonds, will fetch a better price (offer a lower yield) than is obtained
from the housing bonds. Why will investors buy such issues with a
12A point" is one-hundredth of one percentage point in the expression
of yield; i.e., a change of yield from 3.16 to 3.12 is referred to as a drop of four
basis points.
13 See Chapter 4, note 11, for a possible rationality in these differences.
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thinner return than that prevailing on a tax-exempt issue backed
by the credit of the federal government? Sometimes local tax exemp-
tion accounts for such differentials but this advantage accrues only
to local citizens and these bonds are being offered on the national
market.'4
While these differentials indicate something less than perfect
rationality in the market, they are usually small differentials. In
the end, the most important unanswered question is why the market
demands such a substantial yield differential for intermediate-grade
securities, a differential that exceeds any risk calculation that might
be made. The reasons that seem to have the greatest cogency are
institutional and traditional. The two principal institutional buyers
are commercial banks, and fire and casualty insurance companies.
Both of them prize liquidity and both should be considered con-
servative investors. The liquidity of a high-quality credit instrument
is admittedly greater than that of one of intermediate quality.
While we have no solid evidence to support the point, opinions
of dealers seem to be that the marketing cost of selling a lower-grade
security often is considerable. If an investor has to sell an inter-
mediate-grade security before maturity, its higher income may fail
to cover the added costs of liquidating the holding.
To the extent that institutional investors want to preserve
liquidity for periods of economic adversity, the reasons for avoiding
intermediate-grade securities are multiplied. As the two differential
charts show (Charts 10 and 11), a recession of the 1937-1938 magni-
tude increases the yield differentials materially and doubtless would
impair the liquidity of the intermediate grades.
Still another view of commercial banks as investors is that they
are more anxious to maximize their loan income than their invest-
ment income. Loans not only bear a higher rate of return; they
are important to customer relationships and are often determinate
of a bank's ability to attract deposits—the life blood of the business.
The returns from tax-exempt holdings are important, but they
cannot claim top priority. And so banks do not attempt to maximize
their returns from this segment of their assets; they rather lean
14 As mentioned in Chapter 5, state and local government securities are only
tax-exempt as respects federal income taxes and usually the income tax of the
state of issue. States tax one another's issues freely.
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on its quality and liquidity. Banks also take a special interest in
local government and the home state.
On top of this, some weight must be given to the incentives
working on professional investment officers in commercial banks.
An aggressive policy of investment involving some concession to
usual quality standards might increase the rate of return on the
portfolio. But if this policy should involve no more than one or
two conspicuous defaults, the officer rightly fears that he might lose
in salary, prestige, and possibly even in job more than he would gain
from a better rate of earnings. Even if he could demonstrate to his
•board of directors that, as an actuarial calculation, the bank was
ahead by virtue of a higher rate of return on portfolio, directors
do not like losses. They would find it hard to support this philos-
ophy before bank examiners. Bank examiners seem to take a dim
view of what might be called the actuarial view of investment risk.
They criticize calculated risk-taking even though earnings may
suggest the advantage of such a policy. The customs of the financial
community do not tolerate much risk assumption.
The investment policies of fire and casualty companies are quite
similar. They also look to tax-exempt holdings for liquidity and
for that reason prefer high-quality securities. Indeed, it is reported
that the boards of directors of some companies have adopted policies
of not buying less than Aa rated bonds.
The investment policies of individuals vary widely. Dealers report
that some individuals shop for high returns and will assume risk.
But individuals will not take risks for trivial yield differentials.
They will buy a toll road bond with an income approaching 4
per cent rather than a high-grade 2½ per cent obligation, but
probably not for a small differential. Individuals who buy tax
exempts generally are not of a speculative temperament; in fact,
it appears from the Harvard study that investors in
tax-exempt securities tend to be those who would be classed as
"conservative" or capital conserving investors. They are not calcu-
lating risk-takers; they are cautious.
To the extent that individual investment in state and local
government securities is controlled by trust investment policies,
one can be sure that caution and conservatism prevail, that calcu-
J. Keith Butters, Lawrence E. Thompson, and Lynn L. Bollinger, Invest-
ment for Individuals (Harvard Business School, 1958).
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lated risk-taking is rare. A trust department that aggressively im-
proved the returns for most beneficiaries wOuld get few thanks for
the yield improvement; but if they have just one or two publicized
losses, the word might spread and. they could lose trust business.
This is a high order of rationality on the part of trust investment
officers as a safeguard against the irrationality of trust beneficiaries.
In other words, the natural market for tax-exempt securities is
among investors who prize safety and who are not aggressive yield
improvers at the cost of some risk-taking. This comparison can be
made even more explicit: life insurance companies and some self-
administered pension funds have shown themselves yield-conscious;
they are not exactly risk-takers but they are not cautious to the
point of avoiding some balancing of risk with yield improvement.
But these institutions, though of growing importance in the capital
markets, are of moderate importance as buyers of rated tax-exempt
securities. The buyers of tax exempts thus tend to pay a higher
price (or accept a wider yield differential) for investment safety
than is true elsewhere. This fact in turn affects the market for
state and local government obligations in this way: as long as the
volume of offerings is moderate, investors will pay a good price
for tax protection. But when the volume of offerings increases, as
it has in the past few years, the inevitable averaging down of quality
and the need to broaden the groups of buyers tends to have a sharp
effect on yields. The greater fluctuation in yield and price of tax
exempts is not unreasonable in the light of such demand inelasticity.
TERM STRUCTURE OF YIELDS ON STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
Maturity-yield differentials and the patterns into which they fall
are a market factor of considerable importance and have become
one of the most frequently employed empirical foundations for
interest rate theorizing. When maturity is the sole difference be-
tween otherwise homogeneous securities, differences of yield for
various maturities seem to offer clues for answering basic questions
as to why interest is paid or for what service investors demand the
payment of interest. Heretofore analytical attention has been given
mostly to differentials in the high-grade fully taxable markets.
Maturity-yield differentialsfor tax-exempt obligations as repre-
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señted by offering scales introduce a new factor: the discount of
tax rate expectations.
Maturity-yield differentials appear to have been implicit in the
market structures of interest rates for as long as we have reasonably
dependable figures. But detailed measurement of the differentials
and plotting of so-called yield curves did not come until the
1930's. In the middle of this decade Macaulay tested the hypothesis
that the long-term short-term interest rate relationship was a kind
of implied forecast: an upsweeping yield curve forecast rising
interest rates and a downsweeping curve forecast falling interest
rates.16 Though he believed that such forecasting was implied, he
found it to be unsuccessful. He found no evidence that the long-
term interest rates of a period had been anticipated by the preceding
long-term short-term interest rate relationship.
Another hypothesis advanced as an explanation of maturity-yield
differentials was that of liquidity preference: investors, fearing the
risks implicit in the price fluctuations of long-term bonds, would
accept lower returns on shorter maturities as a form of loss pre-
vention as well as liquidity assurance. This hypothesis implied
that an upsweeping yield curve was the normal expectation; that
any other form of curve was a temporary abnormality. But the
historians of interest rates showed that downsweeping yield curves
appear to have been just about as frequent as upsweeping ones.
A third hypothesis was simply imperfection in the market struc-
ture. The smoothness of the yield curves suggested that there was
some arbitraging of nearby maturities but that the market was
segmented to such a degree that remoter extremes of maturity for
otherwise homogeneous obligations could sell at quite different
yields.
Macaulay's pioneer work on the relationship of long-term and
short-term interest rates was followed by the National Bureau's
corporate bond survey. Because the subject of this inquiry was
limited to corporate bonds, early work on the term structure of
interest rates(done by Hickman17 and Durand18) was similarly
16 Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United
States since 1856 (National Bureau, 1938).
17 W. Braddock Hickman, The Term Structure of Interest Rates, an Explora-
tory Analysis (National Bureau unpublished manuscript dated November 16,
1942).
is David Durand, Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942, Technical Paper
8 (National Bureau 1942).
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focused. A second study by Durand and Winn,19 published in 1947,
covered other kinds of bonds including some serial municipal
issues. It is possible that even earlier work was done on this subject
by the technical staff of the Treasury Department, but their work
records unfortunately are cloaked in official secrecy.2°
Very little work has been done on the empirical character of
maturity-yield relationships for tax-exempt securities except for that
of Durand and Winn cited above. The reason could hardly be lack
of data since the yields assigned to various maturities of serial
offerings by underwriters in the form of "offering scales" furnish
a readily available source of data. But there are problems of com-
parability of these scales to those derived from analysis of other
segments of the capital markets.
The securities of the U.S. Treasury and most corporate securities
are offered on the market in single maturity or "term" form;
measurement of the relationship between yield and the period to
maturity is therefore based largely on secondary market observa-
tions. Serial corporate offerings are found only in the form of
railroad equipment trust obligations. The measurement of the
corporate yield-maturity relationship, the "term structure," is there-
fore more difficult than is true of state and local government securi-
ties. For this reason it was only feasible within the resources of
this project to compute an annual term-maturity pattern for each
of the postwar years. The computation was made for the first
quarter of each year and the observations were limited to the
month of February so far as possible. These are shown in Table 26.
Term maturity structures derived in this way are reasonably com-
parable to the Durand-Winn corporate and municipal bond yields.2'
The sole difference is that new issue yields were used rather than
those from the secondary market. This can be viewed as more of
an advantage than a disadvantage: the quality of issues in the
secondary market is diverse and scattered; in some periods itis
almost impossible to get enough observations for the drawing of
'9 David Durand and Willis J. Winn, Basic Yields of Bonds, 1926-1947: Their
Measurement and Pattern, Technical Paper 6 (National Bureau, 1947).
20 The first yield curve published by the Treasury appeared in the Treasury
Bulletin for February 1939, but this analytical device had been used internally
for some time previous to this publication date.
21 Cited above; the basic corporate yields have since been lept up to date
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yield curves. New issues were relatively infrequent when the
Durand-Winn municipal yield curves were being derived and the
secondary market was relatively active.22 Their choice of data was
appropriate to that period. But conditions have since changed and
emphasis is currently on the new issues market. Three of the years
in this series overlap the period computed by Durand-Winn. The
results are so similar that the new-issues basis seems to be fully
justified.
The municipal yield curves are generally not parallel to those for
Treasury obligations and corporate bonds in the following cases:
(a) the upward slope of yields within and after the intermediate
maturities is greater for municipal obligations than for Treasury or
corporate bonds;(b) the dip at the very short-term end of the
scale for Treasury obligations is not found in either the corporate
or the municipal yield curves in anything like the same degree.
Both observations are consistent with recognized market char-
acteristics. The two principal institutional buyers of municipal ob-
ligations—commercial banks and the fire and casualty insurance
companies—both prefer the intermediate maturities. Indeed com-
mercial banks prefer the quite short maturities but, as shown in
Chapter 3, they are unable to meet their investment requirements
within this range. The number of truly long-term investorsis
relatively less than in the corporate bond market. Life insurance
companies and pension funds which dominate this latter market
buy the longest maturities, but neither one is an important factor
in the market for serial municipal obligations. Individuals buy long-
term obligations but at a price. Thus the flatter slope to the inter-
mediate range of the municipal yield curve squares with market
logic. The very short-term end of the Treasury security market is
the liquidity market—the one for bills, certificates, and the like.
It is used for in-and-out investment. This special function of the
Treasury security market often reduces short-term yields rather
sharply. In this respect, short-term municipal obligations are rather
more like corporate obligations than Treasury obligations.
Since railroad equipment obligations are issued in serial form it
might be expected that the municipal and rail equipment offering
scales would tend to be parallel. This is true only part of the time.
Equipment trust offering scales parallel the Treasury yield curve
22 See Chapter 5.
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rather closely and usually show a little more bow in the intermediate
range than is true of municipal bonds. In a period such as the fall
of 1955, the parallel virtually disappeared. Equipment trust obliga-
tions then offered had little slope in their yield curve. In a number
of cases, all the individual maturities were sold "flat," i.e., at the
same yield. Commercial banks tapered off their buying, and equip-
ment trust obligations had to be sold to pension funds. But pension
funds require as high a yield for a short obligation as for a 1ong-
term one. During this same period, the slope to the offering scales
for municipal obligations was usually fully as great or greater than
that of Treasury obligations.
In 1956 further disparities in yield structures developed. When
the money markets became tight, the yield-maturity pattern for U.S.
Treasury obligations beyond the first few years became "hump-
backed." Intermediate-term yields were above both short-term and
long-term yields. But while the slope of the tax-exempt curve de-
clined somewhat during this period, it never flattened out altogether.
Explanation of this dissimilar experience appears to be the seg-
mentation of the market. The tax-exempt market is dominated by
a different group of buyers from the other capital markets. These
buyers have different maturity preferences, hence variations in slopes
of yield curves. Without buyers having adequate resources and
sufficiently catholic tastes in maturities to arbitrage these markets,
such differentials could persist indefinitely. Commercial banks are
the only investors having these characteristics; when they are active,
interest rate relationships show a more rational pattern. But when
commercial banks withdraw from one of the capital markets, as
they did in the latter part of 1955 and early 1956, yield arbitrage
becomes more erratic.
As would be expected, the term structures of intermediate grades
of securities do not parallel those of the top qualities. Generalized
term structures for Baa bonds for a selected number of years were
prepared for comparison with the Aaa term structures and are shown
in Chart 12. As would be expected, the differentials for very short
maturities are modest and tend to widen out for the longer maturi-
ties, with one exception. That exception is the year 1946 when the
two term structures were virtually parallel from the one- to thirty-
year maturity. The investment logic that accounted for this relation-
ship is far from clear. The differential continues to widen up to about
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the fifteen-year maturity in most cases and thereafter tends to be a
constant. The year 1948 is an exception. In that year the differential
continued to spread out to the longest measureable maturity. But
1948 appears to be the one year which conforms to investment logic.
Risk presumably is partly a function of time; the more remote the
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maturity, the greater the range of unforeseen contingencies. The
logic of rating investment quality is largely that of margins of pro-
tection. No security is given one of the top four ratings unless it
offers an "investment" quality likelihood of being paid according
to contract. The margin of protection for the highest two grades
is so large that it is hard to conceive of hazards that would upset
the repayment probability. But this margin is not quite as generous
in the intermediate grades. Time may erode this margin even
further. And it would be logical that the more remote the time
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interval, the greater the possibility, per unit of time, that such
erosion could take place.
The humpbacked nature to the yield curve for Treasury obliga-
tions in 1956. was basically due to the fact that commercial banks
dominate the intermediate-term market. In that year commercial
banks were both net sellers of intermediate-term obligations and
also active traders of such securities in tax swaps.23 Furthermore,
it can be deduced that the very long-term yields on U.S. Treasury
obligations were below those prevailing on intermediate-term ob-
ligations because relatively few long-term securities were outstand-
ing or were being traded in the market. The few which were offered
could be absorbed by investors who preferred U.S. Treasury obliga-
tions for special legal reasons—small state and local government
pension funds, for example.
The offering scale of state and local government obligations, how-
ever, continued to have quite a bit of slope, possibly because the
marginal expectation of investors in tax-exempt obligations is for
higher interest rates. The very longest term obligations can be sold
only if they offer investors somewhat more than can be earned in
the intermediate market. The long maturities have to be baited
with more yield than the shorter maturities of the same issues with
which they are compared by investors.
Still another fact adds further evidence in support of this hypothe-
sis. The offering scales of intermediate-grade tax-exempt obligations
have had even more slope than those of the highest grades. Investors
apparently felt that credit risk was not a proportionate but an in-
creasing function of time. In other words, the maturity-yield rela-
tionship in the market for state and local government securities
23Thefoundation of the process of tax switching lies in a provision of the
Internal Revenue code permitting commercial banks to charge all capital losses
in excess of capital gains against current income. If a security, which is quoted
considerably below book value, is sold and replaced with a security of similar
maturity and yield, the current tax rate applies only to the coupon of the re-
placement issue: the accrual of discount is treated as a capital gain. Thus the
greater the loss now taken, and the greater the proportion of subsequent income
that can be taken on a capital gains basis, the more tax liabilities are reduced.
The principal operating requirement is that commercial banks time their capital
gains and losses in such a way that each tends to be concentrated in separate
tax years. This is necessary so that losses do not have to be offset against gains
but can be charged against current income. The deep discounts and high yields.
which characterize the prevailing humpbacked yield curve reflect the fact that
few investors other than commercial banks are active traders in this part of
the market.
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apparently did not parallel the relationship prevailing in the market
for Treasury obligations because investors in tax-exempt obligations
compounded the joint influence of two risk appraisals: the risk of
further increases in yields (and in capital losses on outstanding
bonds) and also of a more rational time-function credit risk for
lower-grade tax-exempt obligations.
One negative conclusion can be drawn from the comparison of
maturity-yield differentials in the tax-exempt market with those
prevailing on fully taxable obligations: investors do not imply com-
plex tax-rate forecasts in their differential yield appraisal. At almost
every juncture, the observed differentials made no sense if tested
by prevailing expectations as to tax rates. This is a most odd con-
clusion. Investors certainly do have tax-rate expectations. During
most of the postwar decade they apparently were prepared to pay
as much for tax exemption in a remote period as in a nearby one: a
pessimistic forecast of future tax rates! The most probable explana-
tion is that many investors prefer a defensive posture; they will
forego some yield to against the unknown and probably
hostile future.
DIVIDING THE TAX-EXEMPTION SUBSIDY
A rational investor presumably invests in tax-exempt securities
only at yields which are at least equal to, or greater than, the after-
tax yield on fully taxable securities of comparable quality. This
means that the yield differential between tax-exempt and fully
taxable securities should not be a greater fraction of comparable
fully taxable yields than the tax rate applying to this investor's
marginal income. In practice, prudent investors probably do not
go this far. Tax rates are known only for the present and im-
mediate future; an investor may also be rather uncertain about his
income expectations. Thus a prudent investor presumably would
buy tax-exempt securities only if they offered some comfortable
margin of protection against unexpected changes in tax rates and
in income.
To the extent that this describes investment behavior correctly,
the revenue lost by the federal government as a result of state and
local governmental units selling tax-exempt securities will be only
partly reflected in lowered borrowing costs to these governmental
units. The tax revenue lost by the federal government is, in effect,
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split up between investors and state and local government bor-
rowers. Tax exemption can be viewed as a subsidy of somewhat less
than complete effectiveness; a direct subsidy from the federal to
state and local government presumably would not have to be shared
with investors.
The sharing of this revenue loss(or subsidy if one wishes. to
stress the equity considerations) can be viewed as a test of the bal-
ance of market power. If state and local governmental borrowers
retain most of the revenue lost to the federal government in the
form of lower borrowing costs the market could be said to reflect
a strong demand or limited supplies of securities or both. If in-
vestors get most of the benefit, the market reflects a weaker demand,
an ample supply of tax-exempt securities, or both.
A comparison of the yields on tax-exempt and full taxable obliga-
tions such as shown in Chart 8 suggests that there was a consider-
able shift in this division of gain during the postwar decade.
Estimation of this margin is statistically difficult. The measure-
ment of revenue lost to the federal government as the result of tax
exemption presents many technical obstacles; the estimation of re-
duced borrowing costs is almost as difficult. The revenue lost by
the federal government depends on the marginal tax rates and alter-
native investment opportunities of those who buy and own tax-
exempt securities. Present owners have bought the securities they
now hold at varying times in the past: some acquired them directly
from the underwriters when they were first publicly offered; others
were bought in the secondary market. One of the functions of the
secondary market presumably isto transfer tax-exempt securities
from those who can make less complete use of the privilege of tax
exemption to those who can make maximum use of the privilege.
The chore of estimating the revenue losses for all outstanding securi-
ties thus presents a formidable problem. Estimation of the reduced
borrowing cost on all outstanding securities would involve going
far back into the history of such offerings, comparing market yields
for fully taxable and tax-exempt obligations. Even though relatively
simple in concept, the volume of historical research required to
complete such an estimate would be impossibly burdensome.
A rough approximation of this relationship was made by limiting
the comparison to new financing. One year's borrowing cost reduc-
tion for all securities issued during a year was compared with one
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year's loss of revenue to the federal government based on the tax
rates applying to those who initially purchased these securities.
Even this simplified form of comparison involves some conceptual
and statistical difficulties. Changes in the holdings of tax-exempt
securities provided by the ownership estimates are net; they are the
result of gross purchases offset by sales or retirements by call or
maturity. No method could be found by which net changes in the
ownership estimates could be transmuted into a gross purchases
series.
To approximate the revenue foregone, the estimated average tax
rates for the two principal classes of buyers were applied to the
yields on comparable fully taxable securities. The selection of what
is "comparable" for various classes of investors is itself a matter of
judgment. Some alternative investment outlets were introduced into
these estimates: i.e., individuals might switch from tax-exempt securi-
ties to equities rather than to a fully taxable fixed-dollar form of
security.
Estimation of the reduction of borrowing costs follows a similar
pattern; the amount borrowed is multiplied by the differential in
yield between the obligations actually issued and yields on com-
parable fully taxable obligations assumed in this case to be corpo-
rate bonds. Because acquisitions were net, the estimated borrowing
cost reduction had to be adjusted by the ratio of net to gross ac-
•quisitions to make them comparable with the reduction-of-revenue
estimates described above.
Such estimates for the years 1947-1955 are shown in Tables 27, 28,
and 29. Table 27 presents the estimate of revenue lost by the U.S.
Treasury. The owner-buyers of tax exempt obligations are divided
into two groups for purposes of this estimate: corporations and indi-
viduals. A single marginal tax rate is used for individuals; our
knowledge of holdings by income levels does not permit a more
refined division of this group. The assumed investment alternatives
were corporate bonds and stocks. In one estimate the investment
alternative was assumed to be one having the same yield as Moody's
corporate bond series. On the second estimate the investment alter-
native was assumed to be one having the same yield as Moody's
corporate stock series. A third estimate assumed the proportions to
be half of one and half of the other. Assumed differences as to in-
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TABLE 27
Alternative Estimatesa of Revenue Loss to Federal Government











(millions ofBond YieldbYieldbRateInvestmento Investment Z
dollars) (p erc e nt) (millions of dollars)
Investment by Taxable Corporationse
1947 959 2.86 38 10.7
1948 614 3.08 38 7.2
1949 '1,171 2.96 38 13.2
1950 1,886 2.86 45 24.3
1951 1,384 3.08 52 22.2
1952 1,414 3.19 52 23.5
1953 1380 3.43 52 24.6
1954 2,548 3.16 52 41.9
1955 905 3.25 52 15.3
Investment by Individuals
1947 498 2.86 5.13 60 8.5 15.3
1948 1,058 3.08 5.78 60 19.6 36.7
1949 650 2.96 6.63 60 11.5 25.9
1950 550 2.86 6.27 60 9.4 20.7
1951 430 3.08 6.12 60 7.9 15.8
1952 1,143 3.19 5.50 60 21.9 37.7
1953 1,814 3.43 5.49 60 37.3 59.8
1954 794 3.16 4.78 60 15.1 22.8
1955 1,748 3.25 4.06 60 34.1 42.6
Revenue Lost by Federal Government
(millions of dollars)
Bond Investment Equity InvestmentHalf Bond/Half Equity
by Individuals by Individuals Investments by Individuals
Assumed! Assumedu
1947 19.2 26.0 22.6
1948 26.8 43.9 35.3
1949 24.7 39.1 31.!)
1950 45.0
1951 30.1 38.0 34.0
1952 45.4 61.2 53.3
1953 61.9 84.4 73.1
1954 57.0 64.7 60.8
1955 49.4 57.9 53.6
(notes on next page)
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Notes to Table 27 (continued)
aEstimatefor first-year revenue loss based on net purchases of principal investors.
b Assumed to be fully taxable investment.
e Net investment in tax-exempt securities times corporate bond yield times average tax rate.
d Net investment in tax-exempt securities times common stock yield times average tax rate.
eConsistof commercial bank and casualty insurance companies.
f Net investment in tax-exempt securities times corporate bond yield, times average tax rate
for taxable corporations, plus comparable figure for individuals.
g Net investment in tax-exempt securities by individuals, times common stock yield, times
average tax rate, plus comparable figure for taxable corporations based on corporate bond in.
vestment.
h Mean of f and g.
Source: Net amount in tax-exempt securities: Table A-S. Corporate bond yield: Moody's corpo-
rate bond annual average yield series. Average tax rate for taxable corporations is from tax rate
tables in Statistics of Income. Average tax rate for individuals is an estimate made by C. Harry
Kahn of the National Bureau staff. Kahn computed an average of the marginal tax rates for the
various income levels reporting corporate dividends and tax-exempt interest in 1940, weighted
by the amount of income so reported. In that year both items were adequately reported and
tabulated in the Statistics of Income (Part i). He then computed a similar weighted average of
marginal tax rates for corporate dividends in 1947, 1952, and 1954. Tax-exempt interest was not
reported in those years. By adding the absolute rate differential that prevailed in 1940, an
estimated average of weighted marginal rates for holders of tax-exempt securities was reached.
The estimates for the three years were 58.7, 62.9, and 59.8 per cent, respectively. A flat 60 per
cent rate was used since the estimates gave no indication of secular movement either up or down.
All other columns are computed.
vestment alternatives affected the final results less than might have
been expected.
The reduction in borrowing cost for state and local governments
(Table 28) was assumed to be the differential between tax-exempt
and corporate bond yields of a comparable quality. State and local
government offerings were arrayed by quality of issue. The yield
differentials for each quality of issue and between tax-exempt
municipals and the comparable corporate bonds, based on Moody's
annual average yield series, was assumed to measure the reduction
of borrowing cost. Unrated tax-exempt issues were assigned values
a bit below those applying to Baa issues, the lowest rating grade
for which a borrowing cost differential was computed.
The reduction in borrowing cost is compared with the revenue
loss in Table 29. In 1947 from three-fifths to three-fourths of the
revenue lost by the federal government was recovered by state and
local governments in reduced borrowing cost. Up until 1952 this
proportion varied from levels down to as low as two-fifths. But in
1953 it fell to a level between 20 and 30 per cent. It rose slightly
in 1954 and 1955.
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Computation of the estimated division was not made either for
1956 or for 1957. It seemed reasonably evident, however, that in-
vestors reaped most of the benefits of tax exemption. The amount
state and local governments saved on borrowing costs was only a
fraction of the revenue lost by the federal government; investors
retained the bulk of this margin. While the differential seems to
be sensitive to money markets and business conditions, even in a
period such as 1954 state and local government did not recapture
a great deal of the advantage of tax exemption. In the second half
of the postwar decade more of the advantage of tax exemption went
to investors than was retained by state and local governments. No
development now in sight threatens (or promises) to change this
relationship.
The general methods of estimating both the revenue foregone
and the increase in cost of borrowing have precedent in earlier
estimates made by the Treasury Department.24 In 1939 they esti-
mated on essentially this same basis that the amount of revenue
lost by virtue of tax exemption on states and local government
obligations was about double the amount that borrowing costs
would increase if tax exemption were removed.
Conditions were, of course, considerably different at that time.
Exemption from income taxation could also be secured .by invest-
ment in various federal government securities. Rates of corporate
taxation were much lower and the income stage at which progres-
sion was steepest for individuals was considerably higher. After
allowing for these differences, however, the results are fully con-
sistent with the estimates shown in Table 29.
The estimates presented here may minimize the differential be-
tween yields in periods of tense money markets because they are
based on secondary market quotations. The gap between new is-
sue yields of tax exempts and of taxable obligations may have been
more fully maintained than those which prevailed in the secondary
markets. New issue yield series for corporate and state and local
government obligations have not been projected over the entire
postwar decade in a statistically satisfactory way.25 It is probably
24 Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representa.
Lives, of the Seventy-sixth Congress, first session: Proposed Legislation Relating
to Tax-Exempt Securities, June 28 to July 11, 1939, Exhibits 12 and 13, pp. 34-47.
25 In the appendix of this chapter an 18-month new issue yield series for

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.TAX-EXEMPT INTEREST AS COST AND YIELD
true that if such new issue yields were available the tax-exempt
corporate differential probably would be larger in periods of tense
money markets. Nevertheless, since the only clear differences be-
tween new issue yields and those in the secondary markets have
come in periods of tight money markets, it is only in those periods
that the criticism is relevant. For example, in 1954 it was quite
clear that new issue yields were not greatly different from secondary
market yields. In other words, the cyclical variability of the divi-
sion is less than indicated by our estimates. Nevertheless, with full
allowance for this factor, it seems clear that in the period since
1950 investors captured much more of the benefit of tax exemption
than was retained by state and local governments.
Two other facts also seem indisputable. The savings in borrowing
cost were least for the lower-grade securities and it was for these
that the revenue lost by the federal government was the greatest.
In other words, those units of state and local government that
would seem to have been most deserving of aid in reducing bor-
rowing cost or subsidy received the least benefit. The second fact
is that this differential became greater in years of heavy borrowing.
If allowance could be made for the fact that securities are prob-
ably shifted in the secondary market from those who make lesser
use of tax exemption to those who maximize its use, the disparity
between revenue lost to the federal government and reduction of
borrowing cost would probably be even more striking than sug-
gested by these estimates.
Appendix Note to Chapter 6
Measurement of Yields in State and Local Government Market
Measurement of yield in the market for state and local govern-
ment securities presents an unusual number of technical problems.
In the first place, the market is composed of thousands of indi-
vidual issues, each of which has special characteristics. Secondly,
we have too few prices of verified transactions. The offering scales
on new issues are published but these prices represent actual prices
only for successful offerings. On others concessions are common. We
have no record of prices in the secondary market for serial issues
except the asking prices of the Blue List.
These problems are encountered in other bond markets and
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would not be particularly difficult except for still another problem,
that of discontinuity. The continuity needed for index number
construction is hard to manage. Two solutions are possible and
both are employed: a time series can be built up on the basis of
hypothetical quotations supplied by experienced traders, or the
new issue yields of successful offerings can be used as a measure
of the market. Three of the trade yield series—Standard Statistics,
Dow-Jones,28 and the Bond Buyer two series—solve the problem
in the first way. In each case a basic list of bonds is prepared. Each
week dealers are called and asked to supply quotations for each of
these bonds. In some cases several quotations are received; in others
one quotation for each bond is secured. In two of the three series,
the dealers are asked to supply a quotation for a twenty-year bond
of the given city or issuing body. No such bond need exist; it can
be purely hypothetical. One of the series tries to use actual bonds
that average near twenty years in maturity and makes substitutions
from time to time.
Thus these series have some elements of unreality. It is known,
for example, that in some periods actual transactions are shaded
more from Blue List offering prices than is true in other periods.
This may easily be true of these series; they are subjec.t to the
uncertainties of the market. In quoting to a statistical service, deal-
ers are under no compulsion to "shade" price as if they were try-
ing to make a deal. One other feature of some significance is the
fact that two of the three series use relatively high coupon bonds.
It is not clear that in their hypothetical bids the dealers make al-
lowance for this factor.
The second alternative is followed by Moody's Investors' Advi-
sory Service. Using their own rating grades, they array the offering
scales by grade. Using the scales of offerings that are successful (or
of revised offering scales when such are available) the yield value
for the twenty-year maturity ol each quality rating is determined.
The yields of the four top grades are then averaged to produce
the combined index.
The week-to-week and month-tomonth variations in the several
indexes move with considerable similarity. But more surprising,
they seem to retain about the same relationship over bug periods
26 formerly cómpu ted a revenue bond index but discontinued pub.
lication in February 1957.
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of time. The one limit—and this is something that seems to apply
to all of them—is that they lag a bit behind events. This reflects
some lag in the informational process: the levels at which trans-
actions take place take the form of revisions and price shading,
but dealers, although fully conscious of the process, hesitate to
reflect the change in quotations that are to be used for index com-
putation until the change is widely known. This lag probably ap-
plied more on the down side of the market than on the up side.
None of the yield series now compiled generalize the maturity-
yield relationship. Although provision of new primary material on
interest rates was not a part of our project, we attempted to fill two
gaps: to provide a quarterly series of yields, by quality, for several
maturities: 1-year, 5-year, 10-year, 15-year, and 20-year. The latter
was included primarily so as to provide a connecting link with
the existing yield series. The second contribution, mentioned in
the body of Chapter 6, was to determine generalized maturity-
yield relationships for high-grade obligations annually. This was
timed for February of each year and thus was aimed at extending
the Durand-Winn basic yield series.2T Maturity-yields were also
generalized for Baa offerings in selected years to test the effect of
quality on this relationship.
The testing of the various yield series led to one somewhat un-
expected conclusion: general obligation state and local government
securities in ordinary serial form apparently do not have the yield
improvement or "seasoning" gain which is usually characteristic
of corporate obligations. Revenue bonds in term form do pass
through such a stage but a general obligation may never sell on
a better basis relatively than when it is first issued. Thus the dif-
ference between new issue yields and yields in the secondary mar-
ket, which plagues the measurement of corporate bond yields, has
no evident counterpart in this market.
This does not mean that no such differences exist. It only means
that from such evidence as exists, mainly from a short time series
prepared by the Investment Bankers Association of America, the
differences do not have a clear pattern; so far they seem to have
a somewhat random quality.
A comparison of the new issue reoffering yields estimated by
the Investment Bankers Association statistical service with yields
27 Cited fully in the opening to Chapter 6.
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in the secondary market such as shown by Moody's statistical serv-
ice offers some interesting comparisons. In the first place, the new
issue yields for a given quality of security are almost always mate-
rially lower than yields for the same grade in the secondary market.
It is not clear that strict quality comparability prevails. From the
side of cyclical analysis, an even more interesting point is that new
issue yields are clearly more volatile than secondary market yields.
New issue yields rise more quickly and by a greater amount in
tight money periods and fall rather more quickly and by greater
amounts when monetary ease returns. These differences are re-
flected in Table 30. As this table shows, the prompter and more
considerable response is evident in all grades of securities. It is quite
clear, however, that the most volatile response is found in the
highest-grade obligations. This might be interpreted to mean that
yields on lower-grade obligations are less influenced by monetary
factors and are more influenced by quality of security.
The relationship of new issue yields to those prevailing in the
secondary market apparently are not the same for tax.exempt secu-
rities as they are for long-term corporate bonds which are fully
taxable. Since time series for tax-exempt new issue yields cover such
a short period of time and since corporate series are not much
longer the point cannot be affirmed with complete confidence. It
appears, however, that on a new issue yield basis there would be
less of a differential between corporate securities and tax-exempt
securities than indicated by Chart 8. Even with allowance for this
point, tax-exempt yields appear to fluctuate more than corporate
bond yields even when measured on a new issue basis.
New issue yields for securities of varying quality do not always
move in the same direction, as is evident in Table 30. Indeed,
the variations by quality of security are so considerable as to sug-
gest that some of the fluctuations in the market for tax-exempt
securities might be due to fluctuations in the relative proportions
of securities of various quality offered on the market. If the quality
mix of this market is relatively volatile it may mean that new is-
sue yields for given qualities of securities have a somewhat random
character.
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